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ABSTRACT
Zare Afifi, Saharnaz MSECE, Purdue University, August 2014. Securing Sensor Net-
work. Major Professor: Brian King.
A wireless sensor network consists of lightweight nodes with a limited power
source. They can be used in a variety of environments, especially in environments for
which it is impossible to utilize a wired network. They are easy/fast to deploy. Nodes
collect data and send it to a processing center (base station) to be analyzed, in order
to detect an event and/or determine information/characteristics of the environment.
The challenges for securing a sensor network are numerous. Nodes in this network
have a limited amount of power, therefore they could be faulty because of a lack of
battery power and broadcast faulty information to the network. Moreover, nodes
in this network could be prone to different attacks from an adversary who tries to
eavesdrop, modify or repeat the data which is collected by other nodes. Nodes may
be mobile. There is no possibility of having a fixed infrastructure. Because of the
importance of extracting information from the data collected by the sensors in the
network there needs to be some level of security to provide trustworthy information.
The goal of this thesis is to organize part of the network in an energy efficient
manner in order to produce a suitable amount of integrity/security. By making
nodes monitor each other in small organized clusters we increase security with a
minimal energy cost. To increase the security of the network we use cryptographic
techniques such as: public/ private key, manufacturer signature, cluster signature,
etc. In addition, nodes monitor each other’s activity in the network, we call it a
“neighborhood watch”. In this case, if a node does not forward data, or modifies it,
other nodes which are in their transmission range can send a claim against that node.
11. INTRODUCTION
Sensors can play an important role in one’s life. The simplest example is a thermo-
stat so we can have the optimal indoor temperature while saving energy. Sensors,
like oxygen sensors in automobiles, can help us provide a cleaner environment, by
monitoring the environment and providing timely, accurate feedback. Sensors make
our lives easier and more comfortable, however, faulty sensors can be life threatening.
In 2011, a plane crashed (Cork plane crash) because of a faulty sensor in the airplane
engine; the sensor provided wrong information about the pressure and temperature
to the fuel control unit. Investigators found that the sensor was showing a temper-
ature value up to 57◦C/135◦F below the actual performance of the engine, which
caused the aircraft to: roll rapidly left and right, turn upside-down, and miss the
runway completely during landing. The end result of the faulty sensor was 6 dead
and multiple serious injuries [1].
Consider a setting where a city has a number of heterogeneous sensors located
throughout the city, and they are used to monitor the environment to protect it, see
Fig.1.1. For example, there may be sensors in power grid area, industrial monitoring
sensors, underground water sensors to check the quality of underground water, sensors
in subway transportation centers, used for measuring the quality of the air or smoke.
Suppose all of these sensors are connected to some emergency dispatch center. Now,
the emergency dispatch center completely relies on the sensors’ information in order
to determine an emergency situation. The center receives data from the sensors and
determines any emergency status. Based on the information that sensors provide to
the center, the center will determine the emergency and the location for emergency
responders to respond to. If for instance a fire hazard is occurring in a subway station
and the sensors are faulty, the correct warning and/or location may not be determined
by the emergency dispatch center and which can cause a significant problem. In Fig.
21.1, we illustrate a wireless sensor monitor environment and its surroundings. In case
of hazardous behavior, the center informs the Emergency Dispatch Center. Some
examples of sensors: gas sensor (in a Subway/Transportation center), Motion detector
(Surveillance Building, Power Grid), sensors can determine CL, pH, Hg, CO2, O2 of
water (Water Treatment Center, Lake).
Fig. 1.1.: A wireless sensor monitor environment.
In our work, we assume we have a field of heterogeneous mobile sensors with
no trusted third party/no central authority which form a mobile ad-hoc network.
The lack of infrastructure is what makes this network different from a “traditional
network”. If the field is large enough, not all the nodes are within each others’ trans-
mission range. The nodes will use a cooperative communication protocol to transmit
data to the base station which is typically in an ad-hoc network. Because nodes are
mobile, the topology of the network is not consistent and will change over time. The
functionality of the network should be divided or distributed between nodes to re-
duce the vulnerability of the network. Without additional security mechanisms, the
mobile ad-hoc network is not secure because nodes can become compromised/faulty,
3etc. Furthermore, there would be a number of problems concerning trust of infor-
mation transmitted. An adversary can easily access information and/or data inside
the network [2]. For security concerns and avoiding data leakage, nodes need to uti-
lize encryption and authentication mechanisms in order to communicate in a secure
manner. Due to sensors’ lack of a renewable energy source, we need to construct
mechanisms in an energy efficient manner.
In our work, sensors will organize the aspect of the network autonomously. From
this “organization’’, we construct secure energy efficient mechanisms.
42. BACKGROUND
In this chapter, two common topologies of a sensor network will be discussed. We
will discuss their pros and cons and what topology is proper for our sensor network.
Furthermore, we will discuss different types of attacks on the network. Lastly, we
discuss many of the cryptographic tools used in our work.
2.1 Different Topologies for A Network
There are many different topologies for a sensor network. Based on the network
performance and network usage we selected a proper topology to make our network
more efficient. Network topologies are typically based on following [3]:
1. Energy Efficiency: The functionality of a sensor network should be extended
as long as possible. The network topology has an important effect on energy
usage and the way the sensors communicate with each other affects the efficiency
of the network. If we can minimize the energy usage of each sensor we would
save energy for the whole network.
2. Network Lifetime: A network’s lifetime is calculated as when the first node
dies (its energy has drained). Many of the network topologies are based on
developing a topology to use the same amount of energy in all the nodes in a
network.
3. Data Accuracy: The notion of data accuracy depends on the network appli-
cation.
4. Latency: Latency is defined as the delay in data transmission routing and
data aggregation [3]. It can be measured by the amount of time between data
generation in source nodes and data receiving in the base station.
52.1.1 Flat Network
A flat network is a network for which all of the nodes in the network are connected
to the base station. In a flat network, each node plays the same role as other nodes
in the network [3]. Also, all the nodes have the same battery usage. In this kind of
network, data aggregation would be in a way that sink will send the query message
to the sensors in the network via flooding and sensors which have data matching the
query, send a respond back to the sink.
Some disadvantages of a flat network are: it requires significant amount of commu-
nication and computation to the sink [3], if the sink is not connected to a renewable
source of energy the battery will be dead and it will cause the death of the whole
network. Also the communications between nodes would flood in the whole network,
which is again not an energy efficient procedure. Another drawback of a flat network
is inability to guaranty the data delivery. In addition, topology is suitable for a small
network, where all the nodes are at most one hop away from the sink. As you can
see in the Fig. 2.1, all nodes are one hop away from the sink, circles in the figure
represent sensor/ nodes. Lastly, flat networks have weak security.
Base 
Station 
Fig. 2.1.: Flat Network
62.1.2 Cluster-Base Network
If we partition the network into regions or groups of nodes, then we call this
a cluster-base network. A cluster-base network is more energy efficient than a flat
network. In the cluster-base network there is no flooding through the base station.
Cluster-base networks have many advantages [4]:
1. Data will not be flooded through the whole network.
2. The backbone of the network will not be complicated. It will be based on the
number of clusters in the network. The network would be more manageable
from a security point of view.
3. A change in a node will affect that cluster and not the entire network. For
example, if a node becomes faulty or malicious it will not cause significant
damages on the network. If a node moves it might move inside the cluster or it
will become another cluster’s member.
In most of the cluster-base networks there are three types of nodes [4]: i) Cluster
Heads (CH), ii) Normal Nodes, and iii) Gateway Nodes. The cluster head has an
important role in a cluster, it will gather the data from the normal nodes in the
cluster (aggregates it). Also she generates data the same as normal nodes. Normal
nodes only generate data and gateway nodes are nodes that belong to more than one
cluster and the existence of them are not mandatory for a cluster. In Fig. 2.2, we
illustrate a cluster-base network.
The size of a cluster is an important parameter. If the size of a cluster is too large
the communication between nodes would be complicated and uses too much energy
(if the distance between nodes are large). Furthermore, if the size of the cluster is
too small it makes the infrastructure of the network complicated (there would be a
lot of clusters in the network). So there is a trade-off between the size of the clusters
and the number of clusters.
7If e is the power to transmit a message to another sensor with the distance of d,
then the following models the power consumption e for sending the message [4, 5]:
e = kdc. (2.1)
In above equation k and c are constants based on the wireless system, usually 2 <
c < 4. Since the transmission power is at least the square of the distance between
two nodes, we can save more energy if the nodes could send the data in a hierarchical
fashion, which means using cluster-base network.
Base Station 
Cluster 
Cluster 
Cluster 
Cluster 
Cluster 
Fig. 2.2.: Cluster-Base Network
2.1.3 Sensor Network
In a network the sensor’s life cycle would mainly consists of three phases: (i) the
joining phase (a node would join a cluster), (ii) the stable phase (which means a
node belongs to a cluster and has not changed her location yet), and (iii) the leaving
phase (a node abandons her cluster and joins another cluster). Also, each node has a
particular authentication mode: (i) a node could be malicious.(ii) a node has a lack
of battery and becomes faulty, (ii) a node could be in a hibernate mode which means
she cannot detect the malicious behavior if there is any, and (iv) an Honest node. We
8consider hibernate nodes as honest nodes because if even a sensor is malicious when
it is in hibernate mode it cannot do that much damage to the network.
There are several factors which impact the performance of a network and we need
to consider them:
1. Suitable density: If a sensor field does not have suitable density, then there
would be several clusters with few members. Nodes need to extend their trans-
mission range which is expensive in the case of energy usage.
2. Mobile/immobile: If nodes in the network network are mobile, then cluster
membership is dynamic. Sometimes they need to re-cluster.
3. Battery power limited lifetime: A node’s energy is not unlimited and they
are not connected to the renewable source of energy, therefore any node in a
network could be faulty at anytime.
2.2 Network Security
There are two types of attacks that might cause damages in a network: active and
passive attacks. Active attacks are the one that the adversary actually interferes
with the network communication. For example, the adversary modifies data or causes
disconnections in a route. Passive attacks are attacks where the adversary is not
actively trying to interfere. For example, the adversary would listen to the network
communication (eavesdropping) [2,6]. An ad-hoc network is always prone to a variety
of attacks such as:
1. Sybil Attack: A node in the network can make different identities. Therefore
that node can steal an honest node’s identity (impersonate) to access the data
[6]. Without Logically centralized authority, Sybil attacks are always possible.
2. Denial of Service Attacks (DOS): An attempt to disconnect the users from
the network.
93. Data Aggregation Attack: Data in the wireless network can be altered [2,6].
Therefore the decision could be made based on the faulty or modified data that
would be questionable.
2.3 Cryptography
The three aspects of security are commonly partitioned into three areas: Avail-
ability, Confidentiality and Integrity. There are numerous possible security services:
such as privacy, authentication, etc. A security mechanism is a tool/technique that
is used to provide a security service.
Cryptographic techniques are security mechanisms. There are numerous crypto-
graphic techniques and they have been developed to provide some security service.
For example, encryption is a security mechanism that is used to provide privacy.
A cryptosystem (E,D,M, C,KE,KD) is a tuple which consists of an encryption
function E, a decryption function D, a message space M, an encryption keyspace
KE and an decryption keyspace KD such that:
E :M×KE → C,
D : C × KD →M,
where Dk′(Ek(M)) = M .
Symmetric key cryptography, is a class of cryptosystems for which it is easy to
compute the decryption key given the encryption key. Most symmetric key cryptosys-
tems are such that the decryption key is the same as the encryption key. Suppose
(E,D) represents a cryptosystem, where E is the encryption transformation and D is
the decryption transformation then (E,D) is called a symmetric key cryptosystem if
given the encryption key ke it is computationally easy to compute the corresponding
decryption key kd.
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There are two types of symmetric key algorithms [7],
1. Stream Cipher: successive plaintext elements are encrypted using the same
key,
y = y1y2 · · · yL = ek(x1)ek(x2) · · · ek(yL). (2.2)
2. Block Cipher: operates on fix length groups of bits called blocks.
Common block cipher algorithms are: AES, DES, and Triple DES. A common stream
cipher is RC4 [8].
Some advantages of symmetric key cryptosystems: they tend to be fast, simple
and uses less computational resources in comparison to public key cryptosystems.
Symmetric key encryption requires a high level of trust and it is the major draw back
of this cryptosystem. It requires a secure channel which parties can trust to exchange
the symmetric key. Sharing a symmetric key initially is a problem, it has to be shared
in a way that makes sure it remains secret during the exchange.
Asymmetric cryptography is also known as public key cryptography. This cryp-
tosystem uses two keys: a public key and a private key. A public key can be made
publicly available and is used to encrypt messages by anyone who wants to send a
message to that person whom the key belongs to. Private keys need to be kept secret,
and they will be used to decrypt messages.
Theorem 2.3.1 Suppose (E,D) represents a cryptosystem. We call it an asymmet-
ric key cryptosystem if it is not a symmetric key cryptosystem. Thus it must be
computationally hard to find dk given ek decryption key given the encryption key [7].
Some cryptosystems that are public key schemes includes: RSA, ElGamal (signa-
ture scheme).
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The advantages for using a public key encryption are:
1. No need to have a key distribution center.
2. No need to have a secure channel to share a symmetric key. Each member in
network will publish her public key and will keep her private key.
The disadvantages for a public key are:
1. The public key should be authenticated. Without authentication, the sender
would not know the public key actually belongs to that specific sensor or not.
2. Speed. Public key encryption is significantly slower than symmetric key encryp-
tion.
3. Utilizes more computer resources. Public key requires more computational re-
sources, such as memory and CPU time, in comparison to symmetric key en-
cryption.
4. Loss of private key can cause severe security problems. An important problem
is how to handle key update. If the private key is lost by a sensor, then all the
messages that have been sent to that sensor can be read by an adversary.
2.3.1 Elliptic Curve Cryptography
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) has been applied for some time in wireless
networks. The advantages of using elliptic curve cryptography are: (i) speed of elliptic
curve decryption (and elliptic curve digital signatures) (ii) bandwidth, and (iii) less
power and memory will be needed to do these computations (which is important in
a wireless setting where the computing power, memory and battery life of nodes are
limited). This allows a great saving in hardware implementation [9].
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2.4 Cryptographic Hash Function
Cryptography hash functions play a fundamental role in modern cryptography [8].
Furthermore, hash functions also have been used in non cryptographic computer
applications. The focus of this topic concerns message authentication.
Definition: A hash function h is a function that satisfies the following properties [8]:
1. Compression: h maps an input x for an arbitrary bit-length to an output h(x)
fixed bit-length.
2. Ease of computation: Given h and an input x it is computationally easy to
calculate h(x).
3. Preimage resistance: It is computationally hard to find any input which
hashes to that output. If h(x′) = y, given y the corresponding input is not
known.
4. 2nd-preimage resistance: It is computationally infeasible to find any second
input that has the same output as any specified input. For example find the
2nd-preimage x 6= x′ such that h(x) = h(x′).
5. Collision resistance: it is computationally hard to find any two distinct inputs
x, x′ which hash to the same output such that h(x) = h(x′).
The typical usage of hash function in cryptography is as an integrity check. In
this usage, the problem of determining the integrity of a large message is reduced to
fixed-sized small hash values, i.e. a user can maintain a verification of an original
message by computing a hashed value of the original and then anytime it reloads the
data it can verify its integrity by comparing this to the hash of the original data. If
the corresponding hash value from the current data was not the same as the original
hash value then the data has been altered. MD5, SHA1 and SHA2 are commonly
used cryptographic hash functions.
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2.5 Digital Signature System
A digital signature scheme can be created by utilizing public key cryptography
in a way that anyone in the network can verify the signature and only the holder
of the private key can generate the signature. To design a signature scheme, it is
necessary to make two algorithms [10] one for signing and the other one for verifying
the signature. The verifying algorithm is assumed to be accessible to all potential
receivers.
A digital signature would have the following features [8, 10]:
1. A plaintext message space.
2. A signature space (all possible signatures).
3. A key K1 ×K2 → K.
4. A set of key generation algorithm that generates (k1, k2) ∈ K1 ×K2 where k1
is the secret key and k2 denotes the corresponding public key.
5. An efficient signing algorithm, Sig : K1 × M → S assigns a signature s to
a pair: the secret key d ∈ K1 of the signer and the message m ∈ M , i.e.,
s = Sig(d,m) = Sigd(m).
6. An efficient verification algorithm Verify : S ×M ×K2 → {true, false}.
For any secret d ∈ K and any m ∈M :
s = Sigd(m), (2.3)
The signature of m is denoted by s.
Verifypk(m, s) =
 True if s = Sigd(m),False if s 6= Sigd(m). (2.4)
Here pk denotes the corresponding public key. A digital signature system is sometimes
constructed by using a public key encryption, like an RSA scheme or ElGamal scheme.
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ElGamal Signature
In the ElGamal signature scheme, one works in a finite field Z∗p (also known as
GF (p)∗) where p is a suitable large prime. The secret key k belongs to Zp−1 and the
corresponding public key is gk mod p.
The user will publish g, p and gk and will keep k secret.
Signing: To sign message m ∈ GF (p)∗ the user selects a random integer r ∈ Z∗p [10]
where gcd(r, p− 1) = 1 then she calculates:
x ≡ gr mod p. (2.5)
She will calculate:
m ≡ k · x+ r · y mod p− 1. (2.6)
The signature is:
s = Sigk(m) = (x, y). (2.7)
Verification: Given m and S˜ig = (x˜, y˜). The goal is to check if S˜ig is a valid
ElGamal signature of m:
V ER(m, S˜ig) =
(
gm˜
?≡ (gk)x˜ · x˜y˜ mod p
)
. (2.8)
2.5.1 Threshold Signature
If a group consists of n users and they wish to have the ability to create a signature,
as long as t many users agree to cooperate, and cannot generate a signature with less
than t users cooperation, it is called a t out of n threshold signature scheme, (t, n).
Here t is the threshold, the users are called shareholders. The data the shareholders
use to construct a signature are called a share of the key. The entity that construct
the shares is the dealer and the phase they use to construct the signature is the
reconstruction phase [11].
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Each participant Pi, (i = 1, · · · , n) in the group can construct a partial signature
si for message m. They can partially sign a message:
Sigsi(m) = partial signature. (2.9)
If threshold number of nodes in a cluster partially sign a message they can put the
cluster signature on the message:
Sigsk(m) =
∑
Pi∈B
aiSigsi(m). (2.10)
where ai is some publicly known constants dependent on B.
In our work, the partial signature is important especially for signing messages that
will be transmitted outside the cluster or if nodes want to exclude a node from the
cluster. In Chapter 6, we will discuss the usage of this signature.
2.5.2 ElGamal Threshold Signature
The goal is to construct a t out of n ElGamal threshold signature scheme. Here
any t participants will be able to partially sign a message, called a partial signature.
Once we have t partial signatures we will be able to construct an ElGamal signature.
Initialization [10]:
1. The dealer selects a collision resistance hash algorithm H, a prime modulus p, a
prime q that divides p−1, and a generator g ∈ GF (q). Also the dealer needs to
choose a polynomial f of degree at most (t− 1). In addition, the dealer chooses
a public element xi for each participant Pi ∈ P .
2. The dealer sends privately to each participant Pi a share si = ui + f(xi) where
ui ∈R GF (q)\0, the key is k = f(0) therefore the public key of the group is y ≡
gk. Each participants has its own public key yi ≡ gsi mod p and zi ≡ gui mod p.
3. The dealer publishes (H, p, q, y) together with {(yi, zi)|Pi ∈ P}.
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Signing: Given message m and B a set of t participants:
1. Each participant Pi ∈ B chooses a secret key as ki ∈ Zq and computes ri ≡
gki mod p. The value ri will be broadcasted.
2. Each participant Pi ∈ B computes, for B ⊂ P , with |B| = t:
R =
∏
Pi∈B
ri ≡ g
∑
Pi∈B ki mod p,
E ≡ H(m,R) mod q.
(2.11)
3. Each participant Pi calculates their partial signature as:
ci ≡ si
∏
Pj∈B;j 6=i
−xj
xi − xj + kiE mod q. (2.12)
Then the participant will send (m, ci) to the combiner.
4. Combiner verifies all the signature by using the following equation:
gci
?≡ y
∏
Pj∈B;j 6=i
−xj
xi−xj
i .r
E
i mod p. (2.13)
then the combiner will compute:
σ =
∑
Pi∈P
ci mod p.
The triple (B, R, σ) is the signature of m.
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Verification: A verifier, of signature (B, R˜, σ˜) for message m checks if:
gσ˜
?≡ y˜T R˜E˜, (2.14)
where T and E are:
T ≡
∏
Pi∈B
z˜i
∏
Pj∈B;j 6=i
−xj
xi−xj .r
E
i
mod p, (2.15)
E˜ ≡ H(m˜, R˜) mod q. (2.16)
If the check in Equation (2.14) is true then the signature will be accepted.
2.6 Group Conference Key
In [12] Burmester and Desmedt described several secure conference key distribu-
tions for a variety of network topologies. In our work, nodes are broadcasting their
data inside the cluster, so we describe their broadcast scheme here. Let P1, · · · , Pn
be a set of users in a cluster, the users in a cluster will generate the cluster key based
on following, here p and q are two large prime numbers where q|p− 1:
1. Each Pi, i = 1, · · · , n, selects ri ∈R Zq and then computes and broadcasts
zi = g
ri mod p.
2. Each user checks the order satisfies ord(g) = q. Then she computes and broad-
casts:
Xi ≡ (zi+1/zi−1)ri mod p. (2.17)
3. Each user computes the conference key as follows:
Ki ≡ (zi−1)nri ·Xn−1i ·Xn−2i+1 · · ·Xi−2 mod p. (2.18)
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Honest users compute the same key:
K ≡ gr1r2+r2r3+···+rnr1 mod p. (2.19)
In the key generation schemes that will be used, all the nodes need to be authen-
ticated sequentially, if the node i could not pass the authentication process node i+1
will be halted.
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3. RELATED WORKS
The purpose of our research is to secure the network in an energy efficient manner. To
achieve this we need to have proper topology, as well as the proper choices of security
and key sharing schemes. Several researchers have proposed different topologies and
key sharing schemes, we introduce some of the key properties in this chapter.
As mentioned in Chapter 2, several different network topologies have been pro-
posed. Because the flat network is not a proper architecture for mobile ad-hoc net-
works, researchers have mainly focused on the cluster-base network [4]. Some of the
work in cluster-base networks are energy efficient schemes [13, 14], some are K-tree
schemes [15–17]and some are management schemes [18–20].
Regarding the security of the network, some of the researchers have noted that
nodes need to monitor each other in a network, which we call the “neighborhood
watch” [21,22]. Marti, Giuli, Lai and Baker [23] call the nodes monitoring the “watch-
dog”. In their research [23], if nodes do not hear forwarding packets from other nodes,
they regard it as a malicious behavior. Nodes send their packet based on the path
rating. A disadvantage of their work is that they do not punish/disconnect malicious
nodes from network.
Buchegger and Le Boudee [24] proposed the CONFIDANT (Cooperation Of Nodes)
scheme, which is similar to a node monitoring scheme in the network. In their ap-
proach, a node understands if the destination node received the message by receiving
acknowledgment from the destination node. In their work, they isolate the malicious
node from the network in a way that each node chooses a route that does not contain
the malicious node.
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In Rabinovich and Simon’s [21] work, the network has been divided into regions
and each region has its own server. The server decides which sensor is trustworthy or
malicious. Reputation analysis is one of the responsibilities for the server. Further-
more, in their work, servers have vital role in the network, if server is not connected
to a source of energy, her battery will drain quickly.
In all of the cluster-base networks, the cluster head consumes more power than
the other nodes (due to the amount of communication). There are many different
approaches to save energy for a cluster-base network for a node which is the cluster
head. In the Lin and Liu [25] scheme, they rotate cluster head roles to other nodes.
In [25], the authors proposed a way that each node communicates the amount of
energy it has, then in the cluster they re-elect the cluster head based on the amount
of energy. If a node has more energy than other nodes in a cluster she will be a
cluster head. A problem with this approach is that if a node is malicious and wants
to be a cluster head, she may lie about the amount of her energy to become a cluster
head. Moreover, re-clustering may be unnecessary, which could be expensive in case
of energy usage. There is another approach called, TDMA (Time Domain Multiple
Access) [26] which can be used to reduce the amount of energy usage in the whole
network. In this approach the node will go to sleep mode if that node is inactive
(duty cycle).
Zhu, Setia and Jajodia [22], proposed Secure Deep Throat (SDT) protocol. In
their proposal, nodes can use the concept of “witness anonymity” for peer-to-peer
systems. The concept of “witness anonymity” has some disadvantages. First for
honest nodes, second for malicious nodes who wants to use the anonymity system.
With SDT, nodes can make claims against each other without the fear of retaliation
by keeping the identity of a node who claimed against another node. Also it will
determine a malicious node’s identity if that node tries to misuse the anonymity
(send multiple claims against an honest node). If all the adversaries collude together
to find out the source of anonymous claim they would not find that out as long as
the node would not send multiple claims against a node. The anonymity of a witness
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could be maintained even if other members in the network are compromised at a later
time. If a node sends multiple claims against another node, her identity would be
revealed. In their work, they used a Mixnet-based [27] anonymous communication
system so that if a node sends a claim no one can find out her identity. To send
claims, each node maintains two claim databases, one is a private claim and the other
is a common claim. If a node sees a malicious behavior she will store it in her private
claim database, otherwise if the claim comes from another node she will send it to her
common claim database. Each complaint consist of two IDs [21] : the suspect sensor’s
ID and the reporting sensor’s ID. We used their proposal as a model for our claim
broadcasting protocol with the difference of there is no anonymity in our network,
also any anonymous claim would be considered a malicious behavior.
In the Bandyopadhyay and Coyle [28] proposal concerning “Hierarchical Cluster-
ing Algorithm”, each sensor could be a cluster head with probability p. If the node
is a cluster head, she will send advertisements to neighboring nodes for at most k
hops away. The motivation of their proposal is to make the cluster based network
more energy efficient. Moreover, in their proposal they assumed the base station was
centrally located which is an ideal location for a network if nodes need a trusted
third party but in practice a centrally located base station might not be possible. We
adopt our network organization from their work with several modifications, which we
discuss later in Section 6.3.1.
Because the number of nodes in a network is small and nodes do not have any re-
newable resources, they need to be organized in an energy efficient manner. According
to Bandyopadhyay et.al. if the sensors distributed according a homogeneous spatial
Poisson process, in a field with the side of 2a and the number of nodes in the area is
random variable N with mean of λ. Then the field area is A = 4a2. If we assume that
the base station is in the middle of a square area with the amount of n nodes in the
area. The probability of a node becoming a cluster head is p, therefore we have on
average np cluster heads in the network. Let Di be a random variable which denotes
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the length of the segment from a sensor located at (xi, yi), where i = 1, 2, · · · , n to
the processing center. Therefore, we have following as result:
E[Di|N = n] =
∫
A
1
4a2
√
x2i + y
2
i dA = 0.765a. (3.1)
Since the probability of a sensor becoming a cluster head is p, cluster heads and
non-cluster heads are distributed based on the non independent spatial Poisson pro-
cess with intensity of λ1 = pλ and λ0 = (1 − p)λ. As we will describe later, in the
ideal setting the nodes in the network form a Voronoi Tessellation, and the zones in
the plane called Voronoi cells. If Nv is the random variable denoting the amount of
nodes in the Voronoi cells corresponding to the nucleus (cluster head) and Lv is the
total length of the nodes in Voronoi cells connecting to the nucleus, then according
to the [29] we have:
E[Nv|N = n] ≈ E[Nv] = λ0
λ1
, (3.2)
E[Lv|N = n] ≈ E[Lv] = λ0
2λ
3
2
1
. (3.3)
As Bandyopadhyay,et.al [28] noted that the total energy that has been used in a
Voronoi cell would be (C1 is total energy):
E[C1|N = n] = E[lv|N = n]
r
. (3.4)
They also calculated the probability of being a cluster head in the network with an
optimal usage of energy for invitation and based on that the optimal amount of hop
number in a cluster. For sending the data to the base station also they used levels
for cluster heads (level 1, level 2,· · · ), and for sending the data to cluster head level
1 sends it to level 2 and so forth to the base station. For a cluster head to be in a
certain level she needs to flip a coin with some probability.
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4. DATA AGGREGATION
Data aggregation means finalizing information based on other sensors’ data. If a
sensor or couple of sensors in a network are faulty then the decision made, based
on that faulty data could be questionable. Simple statistical functions can be used
for misleading data, for instance: approximate maximum, approximate minimum,
approximate average, and approximate median [30]. In this chapter these statistical
functions and their usage have been discussed.
4.1 Background About Statistical Functions
Consider in a sensor network n sensors collect data, data will be propagated to
the base station. At base station data will be gathered (aggregated) and processed
into information. This can be represented in some computation f(x1, x2, . . . , xn),
where the x1, x2, .., xn represent the sensor readings. Here f is some mapping f :
D1×D2× · · · ×Dn −→ Γ which each Di represents domain and also Γ represents all
possible type of information.
y = f(x1, x2, . . . , xn). (4.1)
By looking at the above equation, we observe that the sensor’s reading will be
turned into information and if one or some of the readings are faulty then the infor-
mation resulting of these readings would be faulty. If, for example, the true reading
of sensor 3 is x3 and the false reading of sensor 3 is x´3, then the information is
y´ = f(x1, x2, x´3, ..., xn) so that y 6= y´ where y is the “true information”, which is the
information that would be the result of sending x3 instead of x´3.
We need to have some kind of metric to calculate the statistics.A necessary tool
that is used to measure the quality of an approximation is some type of metric.
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Formally a metric is some real-valued function ρ defined on some set D×D satisfying
the following: (i) ρ(x, y) ≥ 0; (i i) ρ(x, y) = 0 if and only if x = y; (i ii) ρ(x, y) =
ρ(y, x); and (iv) ρ(x, z) ≤ ρ(x, y) + ρ(y, z) [31] . Common choices of ρ will be the
Euclidean distance ρ(x, y) =
√∑
i(xi − yi)2 and ρ(x, y) = maxi |xi − yi|.
We will denote the metric/measurement between x and y as |x− y| = ρ(x, y). In
theory, one would want to use a metric to measure the quality of the approximation,
but in practice it may not be a useful measure. Consider the following example [30].
Example 1 Suppose n seismic sensors are collecting seismic readings. The sensor
data is then processed to compute y = f(x1, . . . , xn) where y = (y1, y2), here y1
represents the time prediction of an earthquake and y2 represents the duration of the
earthquake. Suppose y∗ = (y∗1, y
∗
2), then to measure the quality we need to compute
|y − y∗|, but observe that many of the common metrics fail to capture the essence of
the prediction (it is more important to determine date than duration) [30].
Therefore the quality of approximation should make sense. Also it is possible that
the best measure does not posses all the properties of a metric.
4.2 Statistical Functions
Let’s assume that we have n sensors, S = {s1, s2, · · · , sn}, if the expected number
of faulty sensors are less than k. We characterize this as (n, k) − property, in a
way that the true reading would not be distinguishable from the faulty reading. But
if the readings are outside some possible bounds those readings would be removed
from consideration. If, for example, one of the readings is out of bound we have the
(n − 1, k − 1) − Property. Giving some sensor’s reading it is computationally hard
to decide if x is a “true reading” or not [32].
Faulty reading questions the security of the statistics which were introduced by
Wagner [33]. The base station can compute some type of simple statistical functions to
understand if the sensor’s reading is out of bounds or not, these statistical functions
include: maximum, minimum, mean, median and mode. A function y = f( · ) is
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insecure if |y − y∗| is not suitably small, where y is true reading and y∗ is faulty
reading. The definition of “suitably small” will vary, dependent on the context of the
application for which it is used.
The statistic sum is calculated as sum = x1 +x2 + · · ·+xn and in the presence of
a faulty sensor it would be sum∗ = sum + (x∗3 − x3). As you can see, if one reading
has a huge error it can affect the sum completely.
Another statistical function is called count which has been introduced by Wagner
[33]. In Wagner’s work each sensor sends 1 or 0, so in the case of faulty/malicious
readings, the count will not change significantly because if there is k faulty sensors,
k is limited and count will change at most k. Therefore, we can consider that count
is a secure reading.
The average is calculated as avg = (x1 + x2 + · · · + xn)/n. Average is insecure
and this follows from the fact that sum is insecure, avg = sum/n. In the presence
of a faulty sensor, we have avg∗ = (x1 + x2 + x∗3 · · ·+ xn)/n and avg∗ = avg + (x∗3 −
x3)/n. Therefore, if just one of the sensors goes faulty the result could be significantly
different from the true result.
If the base station calculates the minimum of a sensor’s reading asmin{x1, x2, · · · , xn},
then the attacker can completely control the result by significantly reducing one of
the sensor’s reading, so min is also insecure.
If the base station computes the maximum of sensor’s reading asmax{x1, x2, · · · , xn},
the attacher can control the result by increasing one of the sensor’s reading signifi-
cantly, also max is insecure.
Suppose the base station computes the mode, which is calculating the most fre-
quent data. If there is k faulty sensors, they could impact the result. Therefore, mode
is insecure.
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4.3 Approximating Statistical Computations
In this section approximate calculation have been introduced to remove the reading
which are out of bounds.
4.3.1 Approximating Minimum
How could the quality approximation be understood for the minimum? Why
would anyone need to calculate the minimum? Is it because of minimum can affect
the performance of a device? Or some action needs to be done? They will vary based
on different situations, but probably the action would be based on the minimum
in comparison to some bound, if the minimum value is below the bound an action
will take place. If the sensors are faulty they could affect the minimum reading
significantly and some action should not be invoked based on the faulty reading.
We would characterize the best metric for comparing some min∗ (the approxima-
tion to minimum) to min (the true min) to satisfy:
min ≤ min∗. (4.2)
Given S = {s1, s2, · · · , sn} the base station can sort the data, outputting it as:
x1 ≤ x2 ≤ · · · ≤ xn. (4.3)
Our definition of min∗ satisfies:
min∗ = (k + 1)stsmallest = xk+1 (4.4)
The property of min∗ satisfies:
Theorem 4.3.1 The approximation min∗ satisfies min∗ ≥ min (here min is the
minimum of the “true readings”).
Proof. Let S represent n sensor reading satisfying the (n, k) − property. Let
x1, x2, . . . , xn denote the sorted data S. Now min
∗ = xk+1. Consider the set
27
x1, x2, . . . , xk+1 these are k readings (in increasing order), so at least one of them
is a true reading. Then min∗ ≥ ” true reading” ≥ min.
We can generalize the question “calculate the min”, to questions like calculate
the 2ndmin, calculate the 3rdmin, .... In general the ithmin, is the ith smallest “true
data value”, in the presence of at most k faulty sensors readings. We suggest an
approximation for ithmin as:
ithmin∗ = (k + i)st smallest = xk+i. (4.5)
Then, ithmin ≤ ithmin∗, for i = 1, 2, ..., n− k.
4.3.2 Approximating Maximum
Why would someone calculate the maximum? Is it because of the performance
of some device would be in danger? Or some actions need to be performed based on
the maximum data? Probably the action would be based on some maximum bounds,
for instance if the maximum would be above the bound, then an action needs to take
place but the action should not be based on the faulty reading. The best metric we
would characterize for some max∗ (approximate max) would be less than or equal to
the true maximum:
max∗ ≤ max.
We define max∗ as:
max∗ = (k + 1)st largest = xn−k. (4.6)
Here the xi represents the sorted data of all the sensors’ reading (includes both true
and false data). Then max∗ satisfies max∗ ≤ max. Analogously, we can define the
ithmax. We would approximate it as ithmax∗ = xn−k−(i−1).
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4.3.3 Approximating Average
The question is, what is the best approximation for an average in the presence
of faulty data? Clearly the approximation should possess some attributes that an
average satisfies. We first observe that:
n−2k∑
i=1
ithmin ≤
n−2k∑
i=1
ithmin∗ =
n−2k∑
i=1
xk+i. (4.7)
Next we observe that:
n−2k∑
i=1
ithmax ≥
n−2k∑
i=1
ithmax∗ =
n−2k∑
i=1
xn−k−(i−1). (4.8)
Now observe that:
n−2k∑
i=1
xk+i =
n−2k∑
i=1
xn−k−(i−1). (4.9)
Now (
∑n−2k
i=1 xk+i)/(n− 2k) is the average of the n−2k smallest “true sensor read-
ings”. Further (
∑n−2k
i=1 xn−k−(i−1))/(n− 2k) is the average of the n− 2k largest “true
sensor readings”. In order to approximate the avg, we define avg∗ (our approximation
to average) as:
avg∗ =
∑n−2k
i=1 xk+i
n− 2k .
Then we have:
Theorem 4.3.2 The approximation avg∗ satisfies that it is greater than or equal to
the average of n − 2k smallest “true sensor readings” and avg∗ is less than or equal
to the average of n− 2k largest “true sensor readings”.
The proof follows from applying Equations (4.7). (4.8), and (4.9).
4.3.4 Approximating Median
The property concerning the median: a median is a member for which roughly
half of the members are smaller than or equal to and half of the members are greater
than or equal to. In general, a set may have one or two medians (depending on odd
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or even cardinality). In the presence of faults, it would be difficult to ascertain a
correct median. If we have n sensors and k of them are faulty what we can ascertain
is that min ≤ xk+1 and xn−k ≤ max. Thus we could measure a potential place for
the true median by starting at these values and go right and left respectively by n/2
places (as illustrated in Fig. 4.1).
X1 .      .      . Xk+1 .     .     .     .      .      .     .      .     . Xn-k .   .    .  Xn 
n/2 
n/2 
Fig. 4.1.: Approximate Median
We define median∗ as (α, β) where:
α = xn−k−n
2
,
and
β = xk+1+n
2
.
That is, we define our approximation for median as an interval (α, β).
The median∗ satisfies the following:
Theorem 4.3.3
α ≤ median ≤ β, (4.10)
where median∗ = (α, β) and median is the “true median”.
Proof. Recall min ≤ xk+1, then β = xk+1+n
2
is such that there are at least n
2
true
data items less than or equal to β. The true median will have at least half of the true
data items (which is bounded by (n − k)/2 and n/2). Thus the true median is less
than or equal to β.
Similarly we can argue that the true median is greater than or equal to α.
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5. SECURITY DESIGN
Several cluster base network architectures have been proposed [13–17, 25]. The ma-
jority of these cluster based network proposals have focused on energy efficiency. For
example, by having the cluster head rotate or by having an efficient cluster size.
However, in all of these proposed algorithms the cluster head plays an active role.
Further, many of these algorithms require a significant amount of communication
due to re-cluster. Note that due to re-clustering, nodes might drop packets and cause
more communication problems. This problem occurs, because the cluster head plays
an active role.
In our work, we reduce the amount of cluster related communication by limiting
the cluster head to have more passive role. Thus, reducing the amount of re-clustering.
We propose a scheme that distributes the work to all of the nodes in a cluster.
Therefore the energy in the cluster head will not diminish as quickly as other proposed
cluster base networks. Moreover, in a cluster base network with an active cluster-head
if the cluster-head becomes faulty or malicious, the security and integrity of data in
the network would be questionable. In our work, if a cluster head becomes faulty,
other nodes in a cluster can detect and expel the node (cluster head) from the cluster.
Therefore the cluster can continue its normal activity without having any problems
caused by a faulty cluster head. In addition, in our work we do not use gateway
nodes. Recall gateway nodes belong to multiple clusters, for integrity purposes we
prefer to limit cluster accessibility for a given node.
5.1 Neighborhood Watch
As Balzanoand and Srivastava [34] noted, cryptography alone is not enough to
secure a sensor network. A node can be compromised and cryptographic techniques
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cannot distinguish the compromised sensor from an honest sensor [21]. We decided
to make nodes monitor each other’s activity, i.e. “police each other’’, which we call
“neighborhood watch”. Rabinovish and Simon [21] also used the “neighborhood watch”
for securing the sensor network. As observed in [30,33], sensors can identify outliers,
thus detecting false readings and/or faulty data aggregation.
The size of a cluster in a network is important. If it is too large, nodes cannot
monitor each others behavior, at least not efficiently. If it is too small, malicious
nodes can take over a cluster. We prefer to have clusters where nodes can police
other. In the case of malicious behavior, other nodes can send a claim against the
malicious node which we call “claim broadcasting”.
As illustrated in Fig.5.1, nodes in a cluster monitor each other. Here “arrows”
indicate that the node is within hearing range. For simplicity we did not show all the
arrows.
 
 
CH 
CH 
Fig. 5.1.: Neighborhood Watch
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5.1.1 Claim Broadcasting
We modified the Zhu, Setia and Jajodia scheme [22] to construct our claim broad-
casting scheme. Here, each sensor monitors the behavior of the other sensors in the
cluster. To achieve this, each sensor has a claim database. If a node sees malicious
behavior, she saves it in her claim database and broadcasts it to other sensors in the
cluster. Once a majority of the sensors make a claim, they can punish the offending
sensor.
In a sensor network, claims against a node could be troublesome as Zhu, Setia
and Jajodia observed in their paper [22], if an honest sensor makes a claim against
another node who is malicious, the malicious node may retaliate and make a claim
against the honest node (a form of tit-for-tat behavior), for this reason they used
witness anonymity scheme. In our network, we do not allow any anonymous claims
and nodes would count the anonymous claims as malicious behavior.
5.2 Which Node is Malicious
There are two types of adversaries [22]: selfish users and malicious users. A
selfish user may not participate/contribute to the cluster infrastructure and takes
advantage of the cluster computing resources/network. For example, a selfish user
might not forward a message have been sent to her. Malicious user is a user who will
act mischievously for example they may want to modify the data or replay messages.
Nodes may be malicious due to faulty behavior. For example, they may be faulty due
to lack of energy sources such as diminished battery.
5.2.1 Detecting a Malicious Node
Not only is the detection of a malicious and/or selfish node in a network important,
but discovery in a timely manner is vital. As [21] noted, “the more neighbors a
compromised sensor has, the more complaints will be sent to the server and the
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sooner it will decide to exclude that sensor”. In our work, we do not have a trusted
third party in a cluster, but we trust the majority of cluster members. Note, if a
node is faulty they may unintentionally help malicious nodes. Observe, in our view
of faulty node it is malicious.
5.3 Final Design
In summary the design should have these following qualities:
1. No network infrastructure.
2. In order to achieve greater integrity of data collection, we should be able to
monitor the behavior of sensors in a neighborhood (cluster) at a low energy
cost.
3. The network should be partitioned into small clusters.
4. There will be no active administrative head in each cluster.
5. We trust the majority.
6. There should be a mechanism to achieve a secure claim broadcasting.
7. The base station should be confident that the data they are using is accurate
and trustworthy.
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6. OUR APPROACH
In our work, nodes join a cluster, the nodes make keys autonomously, which means
without any help from base station or a trusted central authority. Besides making
a sensor network more organized, our network will be secured in an energy efficient
manner. Some of the challenges include: How can we trust their identity? Are these
sensors from the same network or not? We know that any sensor in a network can
masquerade about her identity. If a node is malicious she can steal other honest
nodes’ identity and it makes them look malicious. One question is how in a network
we can prevent the malicious or selfish behavior? If it happens how could the network
detect that? In other words, how can we make a trustworthy network? In all wireless
sensor networks we need to prolong the network’s life time as much as possible with
the suitable amount of security, therefore energy efficiency is another issue.
In this chapter, we provide the details about achieving the security design charac-
terized as a “neighborhood watch” and we discuss different types of security schemes
that we can use for our network to make the network more secure. By the end of this
chapter, we will have answered all of above questions.
6.1 Assumption Concerning the Sensors that are Deployed
Trust is a significant barrier in our network, no nodes can trust each other when
they first meet. In our work, we make the node’s manufacturer as an off-line trusted
party, much like a certificate authority [8]. The manufacturer can give nodes some
information which can help the nodes trust each other. When a node is made by a
manufacturer, the manufacturer will give the node an ID, a public key/private key
pair and a manufactured date. All the information that the manufacturer provides
for the node will be signed by manufacturer. This information, “ID Card”, would be
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comparable to a “Public Key Certificate”. Whenever a node wants to communicate
with another, she should transmit her “ID Card” to the other nodes (private key never
leaves the node). Using signed IDs for all the nodes in the network would remove
the problem of impersonation in the network. Fig. 6.1 illustrates the node’s ID from
manufacturer the dotted line shows the nodes private key. Note the private-key is
not part of the ID. Rather it is stored in a secure location on the node.
ID: 54342 
Manufacture Date: 05/14/2014 
Public-Key: 13209240834704794838439048 
Manufacture Signature:032498478334089 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
Private-key: 12398493843094832833939329 
Fig. 6.1.: Node’s ID from manufacturer
We assume all nodes are familiar with the manufacturer’s public key and that
nodes can distinguish the manufacturer’s signature from other signatures. As a node
ages, the trust of a manufacturer’s signature will decrease. The longer a node is active
the probability of being malicious becomes higher, especially since a node can become
faulty due to diminished battery. Essentially, we have a situation of a certificate
authority who is unable to revoke certificates. Thus the trust in the certificate will
diminish over time.
In our model, we assume that the base station is located far from the sensor nodes
and is not centrally located. The communications between nodes and the base station
will be based on their job description, delivering the sensed data that is needed. Nodes
do not contact the base station for superfluous reasons.
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We achieve a cluster-base network that is more secure because of sensors visibility
monitoring each other in a cluster. Each sensor knows their group members. Because
of this, data is more trustworthy.
6.2 The Importance of the Manufacturer Information and Signature
Without having any central authority for which sensors can trust and rely on,
some specific information cannot be trustworthy. Thus we need to have some kind
of information which has been set by the manufacturer. Without the manufacturer
signature, a node can impersonate and no nodes would ever know if the node she
tries to communicate with is in her network or not. The list of information IPj that
a node Pj needs from their manufacturer is:
1. Identification Number or ID.
2. Public Key pkPj ,Manufacturer.
3. Manufactured Date.
Also all of these information have been signed by manufacturer, by:
σPj = signed ID = Sigpk,Manufacturer(IPj). (6.1)
6.3 Invitation Rules
In our work, nodes generate clusters autonomously. The cluster generation is
executed in a greedy manner. A node accepts the the first cluster invitation that it
receives and does not search for an invitation for which the cluster head is the closest.
This is to ensure the communication links in the cluster does not become severed.
In Chapter7, we discuss our simulation results of our approach and how closely it
compares to the ideal cluster formation.
In our approach, each node has a probabilistic chance to be a cluster head. If they
are a cluster head, they broadcast an invitation to other nodes to join their cluster.
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Nodes that receive the invitation have the choice to accept or reject. It is possible
that nodes may propagate the invitation to neighboring nodes depending on the
preselected parameter diameter (hop size). These properties can be troublesome, you
could possibly have neighbors for which one accepts and the other rejects causing a
disconnection in the network. The following is the procedure for sending an invitation
and making a cluster. We modified the Bandyopadhyay and Coyle [28] proposal:
1. Each node flips a coin with probability of p to determine if it should be a
cluster head. This probability p is a preselected parameter. It is probably
selected based on the density of the network and type of network security you
want to achieve.
2. If a node is a cluster head, she will send an invitation to neighboring nodes with
her “ID Card” from a manufacturer. In the invitation it will indicate how many
hops it should be propagated, i.e. the desired diameter of the cluster, which we
denoted by k hops.
3. Nodes listen and wait for the preselected period of time T .
4. If a node receives an invitation from another node(propagator), she will keep
track of the sender(propagator) and the cluster head’s information such as: the
cluster head’s ID, the number of hops, and her public key.
5. If a node, after expiration of time T , has not received any invitations, she will
become her own cluster. That is, she is a “forced cluster head”.
6. If a node gets an invitation, she will respond to the invitation immediately from
a propagator.
(a) The node sends to propagator, signing its acceptance and forwards its
manufacturer certificate. This will be propagated all the way to the cluster
head inviter.
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7. After time T , a node who has decided to be in a cluster, will respond back to
the propagator with her “ID Card” and a signed acceptance. This is continued
to be passed back to the cluster head.
8. Once the cluster head gets a node’s acceptance, she will verify all signatures
and send the list of the cluster members their “ID Card” and then signs the list
to all members. This list contains all the node IDs and public keys.
9. The cluster head sends a request to all the nodes in the cluster to make a group
signature key and the cluster certificate.
Note, if a node accepts then the propagator accepts. This approach is a greedy
approach “accept the first invitation”.
All the nodes need to wait until time T to respond back to the cluster head but if
all nodes respond back at the same time collisions may occur. This problem can be
resolved by using different sized contention windows, this topic is out of the scope of
this research.
6.3.1 Invitation Protocol
Recall Sigsk,Manufacturer denotes manufacturer’s signature, CH denotes the cluster
head and N represents the set of nodes in the network.
Algorithm 1 Invitation Protocol
1: for all Node ∈ N do
2: Node.CH=CoinFlip()
3: Run ClusterInvitation()
4: for all Node ∈ N do
5: if Node.CH = Y es then
6: Send a list of all the nodes who accepts the invitation with her
SigCH(CH.ID , CH.PubKey)
7: Send a request to make a group key and signature
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Algorithm 2 CoinFlip()
1: result← Flip a coin //note this is a random value in the interval (0, 1)
2: if result < p then
3: Node.CH=Yes
4: else
5: Node.CH=No
6: return Node.CH
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Algorithm 3 ClusterInvitation()
1: for all Node ∈ N do
2: Node.hop = 0
3: Node.inviter = 0
4: for all Node ∈ N do
5: if Node.CH = yes then
6: Broadcast invitation
7: for all nodes in the hearing range do
8: if Node hears Node′ AND Node.inviter = 0 then
9: Node.inviter = Node′ information
10: else
11: if Node.inviter 6= 0 AND Node.inviter.hop+ 1 < K then
12: Node.hop = Node.inviter.hop+ 1
13: Broadcast invitation with Node.Sigsk,Manufacturer(Node.PubKey , Node.ID),
nodes in the hearing→ Node.inviter = 1
14: for all Node ∈ N do
15: if Node.inviter = 0 then
16: Node.CH=Yes
17: for all Node ∈ N do
18: if Node.inviter = 0 then
19: Node.CH=Yes
20: else
21: Send the acceptance to Node.inviter with
xxxxxxxx Node.Sigpk,Manufacturer(Node.PubKey, Node.ID)
The diameter of a cluster is dynamic due to the mobility of nodes. After some
time, some nodes may leave the cluster. As illustrated in Fig. 6.2, a sensor receives
and then propagates the invitation based on the current hop number and max-hop
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hop1 
hop2 
hop3 
hop2 hop3 
Fig. 6.2.: Invitation
parameter k. Here, circles around the nodes illustrate the broadcast transmission
range and the arrow illustrates invitation propagation.
The concept of an ideal cluster formation is a Voronoi cell.
Definition 1 [35] Let P be a set of points in R2 plane, a Voronoi diagram of P,
denoted by VP , is the collection of Voronoi cells Vp. For each point p ∈ P:
Vp = {x ∈ R2|‖x− p‖ ≤ ‖x− q‖ for any q ∈ P}
Fig. 6.3 [35] illustrates an ideal Voronoi cell. Here the dots represents the gen-
erator, in our case cluster heads. A node belongs to a cluster provided the distance
between that node and its cluster head is smaller than the node to all other clusters.
The invitation algorithm has the same effect of Voronoi diagram, we simulated
our invitation protocol using 50 nodes in an 8 by 8 region, each node has a range of
1.79, with the hop number of 2 and the probability of being a cluster head is 0.2, our
results are illustrated in Fig. 6.4. CHs on the figure are cluster heads also nodes will
wait till time T to get the best invitation with the least distance. Nodes will accept
the best invitation in this simulation. In our test, nine clusters have been generated.
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Our result is near to Voronoi Tessellation, but the result in this simulation is not
realistic because for simulating the Fig. 6.4 we used C programming which is a serial
program, because of that it is not a realistic result. To achieve a more realistic result,
we simulated our algorithm in a threaded program. We will describe the simulation
results in Chapter 7. In our work, the most important thing for making a cluster
is visibility and number of nodes in a cluster, we are not worried about making a
perfect Voronoi Tessellation, the reason we are using an algorithm to make a cluster
near to a Voronoi cell is because the energy usage for nodes to communicate inside
the cluster would decrease.
Fig. 6.3.: Voronoi Cells
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Fig. 6.4.: Tested Result
6.4 Cluster Head’s Roles
In most of the cluster base networks, cluster heads play a vital, active role. As
we have noted, in our work the role of a cluster head is limited. After a node decides
to be a cluster head, she will send an invitation. Upon receipt of an acceptance, she
will send the cluster list to all members. She then directs the cluster to generate a
signature key. By constructing a cluster head with a limited role we are able to handle
the case of a cluster head becoming faulty. Also the cluster head is the first node in a
cluster who sets the symmetric key to nodes to communicate secretly inside cluster.
We assume cluster heads are honest in the beginning of the formation of network.
6.5 Intra Cluster Communication
Within the cluster, private communication could be achieved by using public
key cryptography, which is expensive. Also it could be based on a symmetric key
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cryptography, which is easier and has less computation. A cluster can use a symmetric
key for a period of time, after a while the cluster needs to change this symmetric key.
The greatest draw back for using the symmetric key is it needs to be distributed over
a secure channel which we can make the key passing secure by the following:
EPkPi,manu{Symsession}. (6.2)
Initially the cluster head makes the symmetric key because she wants to commu-
nicate with every one secretly for sending the group information. Therefore, the cost
for the cluster head to broadcast to all nodes k hop away would be at most kn. In
the future, a node wants to communicate a symmetric key, the cost for her to send
the symmetric key to all the nodes would be at most 2kn.
6.6 Threshold Key Generation
The concept of group oriented cryptography has been introduced by Desmedt [36]
in the way that when the key is controlled by a group (threshold of the group)
rather than individuals. The following is Pedersen’s scheme [37] on threshold sharing
with verification, an improvement of Frankel and Desmedt threshold cryptosystem
scheme [38]. Assume p, q and g are agreed in the network beforehand, such that p
and q are two sufficiently large prime numbers which q divides p − 1,Gq is a unique
subgroup of Z∗p of order q, and g is a generator of Gq.
Fix a cluster C. If we have n sensors in cluster C and t is a threshold such that
1 ≤ t ≤ n, then the key is shared to the n sensors so that t of nodes need to cooperate
to generate the key. Also, we assume that t ≤ n+1
2
, in this assumption a majority of
the sensors are honest sensors. The manufacturer has prescribed the p, q and g. The
goal is for the cluster to generate a cluster public key h ∈ Gq, so that any t members
can compute the secret key is x where h = gx mod p.
We represent sensor i by Pi. We let C(m, r) denote the commitment to m ∈
{0, 1}∗, using the random stream of r.
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The key generation is as follows:
1. Pi chooses a random number xi ∈ Zq and computes hi = gxi mod p. Then the
sensor will select a random number ri and broadcast the commitment Ci =
C(hi, ri) to all the members in the cluster.
2. When all n members of the cluster have broadcasted its commitment, then each
node Pi opens the commitment Ci = C(hi, ri).
3. Public key for the group is h =
∏n
i=1 hi = g
∑n
i=1 xi , which is broadcasted to the
cluster. The secret key is
∑n
i=1 xi, notice no members know the key, but all
know the public-key h.
The following method shows that how x, which is the secret, is shared to the
sensors. The degree of the polynomial is at most t− 1.
(a) Each sensor Pi chooses a random polynomial which has at most degree
t− 1 where fi(0) = xi the polynomial would be:
fi(z) = fi0 + fi1z + ...+ fit−1z
t−1 where fi0 = xi. (6.3)
(b) Pi computes Mij = g
fij which is the generator to the power of that sensors
polynomial number. So j = 0, ..., t − 1, Note Mi0 = gxi has already been
transmitted.
(c) When all sensors Pi in the cluster sent their t values, then Pi will send
sij = fi(j) secretly and a signature on sij to Pj for j = 1, ..., n.
(d) When all the sensors send those t− 1 values, Pi sends sij = fi(j) secretly
and a signature on sij to Pj for j = 1, ..., n.
(e) Pi can verify the share it receives from Pj (which is sji) is consistent by
the following equation:
gsji
?
=
t−1∏
l=0
M i
l
jl . (6.4)
If this fails Pi has discovered an error and terminates.
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(f) Pi computes its share of the key by computing si
∑n
j=1 sij. Finally Pi signs
h.
In the above scheme, if the amount of nodes in a cluster is n, in any broadcast a
node’s broadcast cost would be at most 2k because of the distance between two nodes
would be at most 2k. Because there are n nodes in a cluster, the cost of broadcast
for all the nodes in a cluster would be at most 2kn2. In the above scheme for making
a threshold signature in a cluster, there are three broadcasts, first for sending the
commitment to all the nodes. Second, sending Mij, And third sending the sij to all
the nodes in a cluster. The cost of broadcast for Mij would be at most tkn
2 and for
sending sij is 2kn
2. Therefore, the cost of making a threshold signature in a cluster
would be at most 4kn2 + tkn2 = O(tn2) and because number of nodes in a cluster are
small the cost of broadcast is not significant. If we have a star base network, which
means that all the nodes are one hop away from the cluster head, the cost will be
calculated with k = 1.
6.6.1 Giving Access to a New Node in a Cluster
If a node joins a cluster then there should be some probation time for which
activities can be monitored before the node is provided full cluster privileges, in
particular shares of the signing key. The probation time will be determined based
on if there exists a signed certificate membership from the previous cluster the node
belonged to. If there does not exist a signed certificate of membership then the time
will be longer in duration. The probation time can be kept by one of the members
of the current cluster. The probation time will start once all members of the cluster
have a copy of the node’s public key and signed ID (by the manufacturer).
When the trust issue has been resolved group members will give the new group
member permanent access, which means that the new node can participate in the
group signature generation.
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If the current cluster consists of members {P1, . . . , Pn} and the new node is rep-
resented Pn+1. For i = 1, . . . , n let fi(z) denote the sharing polynomial (see Equation
6.3), the polynomial of degree t − 1. Then cluster member Pi sends Mij = gfij
(j = 0, . . . , t − 1) to Pn+1. In addition Pi sends si,n+1 = fi(n + 1) privately to Pn+1.
Thus, Pn+1 can verify the shares si,n+1 using Mi,j. Then Pn+1 computes sn+1 by:
sn+1 =
n∑
j=1
sn+1,j. (6.5)
When node Pn+1 wants to join a cluster, she first needs to broadcast her “Trust
Certificate” from her previous cluster to the new cluster, the cost of this would be
at most kn. After the probation time for the new node has expired, the new cluster
generates for node Pn+1 a share of cluster signature key using Equation (6.5). The
cost for the broadcast needed in this procedure would be 2kn. Therefore giving access
to a new node Pn+1 in a cluster would be O(tn).
6.7 Sensor Leaving a Cluster
When a node leaves a cluster she should have her current cluster group members
sign her trust certificate, if her trust rate is low she might not be able to immediately
join another cluster.
How the cluster deals with a node leaving If a node leaves a cluster she
will have her last share from the last cluster. After she joins another cluster she will
eventually be provided a new share. However, if she increases her reception range
she may be able to listen to the previous cluster’s communication. There are several
ways to handle this problem. First, because all the nodes have a claim database if
a node leaves a group, then they can look at their own database and compute the
trust rating of the node. If they see the node was trustworthy, then they may not
reshare the key. Second, if we want to maintain high security, then immediately after
a node leaves a cluster, the cluster will change the reshare the group key. Therefore
other nodes which have left the group cannot hear any communication from their
previous cluster. While more secure, this option consumes more energy. Between
48
these two options, there is a third alternative, a trade-off between the energy and
security. Changing shares consumes energy and makes the network more busy and
might cause some delays on data transaction, but if the shares do not change then
there is a possibility that some node that is faulty or malicious can eavesdrop on
communications. Definitely, if the threshold amount of sensors leave a cluster, the
cluster needs to make new shares anyway due to lack of sensors to make group key.
In practice, it is wiser to re-share whenever more than one-half the threshold has left.
6.7.1 Proactive Secret Sharing
In our work, we prefer to limit the amount of cluster key renewal, instead renewing
the shares for the same key. If clusters change their key they need to renew their
“cluster certificate” and this will require bandwidth. Herzberg et al. [39] proposed a
proactive secret sharing scheme, which provides a way for the group key to stay the
same but nodes in the network refresh ( change) shares. The secret sharing scheme is
based on Shamir’s scheme [40], in their model there is a dealer who knows the secret
key for the group, the dealer will choose a random polynomial of degree t− 1 over Zq
subject to the condition f(0) = x which x is the key for the group. Then the dealer
calculates si for each participant and sends it to participants Pi. The dealer chooses
a polynomial with degree t− 1 over Zq the same as following:
gsi = (gf0)(gf1)i(gf2)i
2 · · · (gft−1)it−1 mod p. (6.6)
So if t sensors provide their shares they can compute the secret key x. Herzberg et
al. assumed that there is a global clock that all the nodes can access and the shares
would be changed after a period of time. They have t out of n threshold scheme,
so that the adversary needs to at least compromise t nodes to access the key. If the
shares do not change after some period of time, an adversary can get into system
by using sufficiently many compromised nodes’ shares. To defeat this, nodes in the
cluster need to renew their shares after a period of time. Each sensor Pi will choose
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a random polynomial δi of degree t − 1 where δi(0) = 0. So for each participant Pi
we have:
fi,new(z) = fi,prev(z) + δi(z) mod q. (6.7)
Thus,
fnew(z) =
n∑
i=1
fi,new(z) mod q. (6.8)
Hence,
si,new = fnew(i) =
n∑
j=1
fj,new(i) =
n∑
j=1
(fj,prev(i) + δj(i)) = si,prev +
n∑
j=1
δj(i) mod q.
(6.9)
Because δi(0) = 0, the secret x will stay the same and shares are going to be
renewed. Let a1, a2, · · · , at be the interpolation coefficients, such that, based on
Shamir’s scheme
∑t
i=1 aixi, nodes could get the secret key x from the following equa-
tion and the renewed share would not change the secret key x:
x =
t∑
i=1
aisi(new) (6.10)
=
t∑
i=1
ai
(
si +
n∑
j=1
δj(i)
)
(6.11)
=
t∑
i=1
aisi +
n∑
j=1
t∑
i=1
aiδj(i) (6.12)
= x+
n∑
j=1
δj(0). (6.13)
(6.14)
Note that we can apply techniques to changes the threshold.
6.8 Excluding a Node from a Cluster
Each node Pj in a cluster will examine its own claim database. If there are enough
claims (equal to or greater than the threshold) against a node Pw then the node will
broadcast this to all members in the cluster as well as the partial signature of this
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claim. In turn, cluster members will respond with the same if they also have greater
than or equal to the amount of threshold many claims. Once a threshold amount of
claims have been partially signed a full signature can be generated. At this time the
cluster can punish the malicious node Pw (dispel them from the group). Immediately
the cluster reshares the group signature key. Formally the complaint protocol is given
in Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4 Complaint Protocol
1: if Node Pj senses malicious behavior then
2: Node Pj stores it inside the private complaint database and broadcasts the
complaint and its signature, signed by using pkPj ,Manufacturer
3: else
4: if Node Pi receives complaint about a node then
5: Node Pi will store it inside the common complaint database and forward the
complaint to other nodes
6: if Node Pj has the threshold amount of complaints from the private and common
data base then
7: Send a signed request of expelling the node from the cluster and a partial
signature
8: if Node Pi receives threshold amount of requests for expelling a node then
9: Node Pi sends a request for expelling the malicious node from cluster with the
nodes’ signature and ID to all the members for expelling the node
10: Nodes will change their shares or re-key therefore malicious node cannot par-
tially sign messages or hear the cluster members
11: if Node Pi claims against node Pj and she put wrong signature on her claim then
12: Other nodes will count node pi as a bad node and they write her in their claim
database
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6.8.1 Cluster by Cluster Communication
As we are concerned about the safety of a network, cluster by cluster communi-
cation needs to be conducted in a secure manner. Nodes in one cluster cannot trust
nodes in another cluster and send their data. Clusters need to show some kind of
certificate to other neighborhood clusters to make other clusters in their neighbor-
hood trust their information. The cluster certificate contains information about all
the cluster members ID, public key, and their manufacturer signature see Fig. 6.5.
Because making a public key is expensive, nodes in a cluster can make a symmetric
key to communicate with other neighborhood clusters. If cluster Ci wants to commu-
nicate with the neighborhood cluster Cj the nearest node in Ci would make a key and
she would partially sign it. Then she will send the key to the members in cluster Ci
to make a signature on the selected key. Next, she will send the symmetric key which
has the group signature to the Cj. After Cj gets the key from cluster Ci, the nodes
in cluster Cj also sign their acceptance for using this key for further communication.
Therefore, the setup for secure communication between cluster Ci and Cj would be
as following:
1. Cluster Ci, sends the cluster certificate and agreed symmetric key to cluster Cj.
2. Cluster Cj checks if the certificate and manufacturer signature are correct.
3. After cluster Cj agreed with the cluster Ci’s cluster certificate, cluster Cj, sends
the cluster certificate with the acceptance for the symmetric key.
4. Cluster Ci checks if the certificate from cluster Cj is correct or not, if it is right
then cluster Ci sends the data or message to cluster Cj.
Other nodes in cluster Ci and Cj know the symmetric key between these two
clusters in case of modification other nodes can detect that modification. The cluster
certificate might be long and it depends on the number of nodes in a cluster, therefore
it might need to use significant bandwidth. Because we want to save energy, we prefer
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to have certificate exchange once or repeat it after a long period of time. After the
exchange of the cluster certificate, when the cluster Ci wants to send data to the
cluster Cj, they would just sign it with cluster signature key. It is one of the reasons
why we prefer to renew the shares instead of changing the key in case of malicious
behavior in a cluster, because the cluster would need to make another certificate and
send it to the neighborhood clusters this and procedure consumes a lot of energy. We
should note that symmetric key needs to be changed after some period of time.
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Fig. 6.5.: Cluster Certificate
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7. EXPERIMENTAL MODEL AND RESULTS
In our simulation we used a threaded program to simulate the invitation protocol
(Algorithm 1). To for control the sequence of nodes, we used a thread called man-
agement to coordinate the action of the nodes, in the thread programming.A node
would pass through several stages as illustrated in Fig. 7.1. S1, stage 1: nodes are
randomly placed in the field (x and y coordinate), S2, stage 2: nodes flip a coin to
decide for being a cluster head or not, S3, stage 3: if a node is cluster head she will
send invitation if not, S4 stage 4: she will wait for invitation until time T , if she gets
an invitation she will accept the first invitation then she will check if her hop number
is less than desire hop or not, if it was less then she will send invitation to other nodes
in her range. S5. stage 5: after time T , if a node did not receive any invitations from
other nodes, she will become a forced cluster head. To make sure that all the nodes
followed all the processes which have been controlled by management, when a nodes
wants to enter a process we lock out other nodes’ access to that process by using
mutex lock [41].
7.1 Discussion
In the [28] Eq. 3.1, the processing center is in the middle of the network field. If
we move the base station to the corner of the square field, the result would be:
E[Di|N = n] =
∫
A
1
4a2
√
x2i + y
2
i = 0.765(2a) (7.1)
If the total energy used by a sensor to communicate to all inside the cluster where
the communication is initialized by the cluster head is e1, then in our proposal the
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Fig. 7.1.: Invitation Stages
total energy usage for nodes communicating with each other will be less than the
Bandyopadhyay and Coyle proposal. In their work if nodes wants to communicate
they need to send their data first to the cluster head and cluster head has the respon-
sibility to forward the message to the destination node. In our work nodes find the
shortest route to send data, the cluster head would not be central distributer of all
the communication,so the route a data would travel is shorter. Therefore, less energy
consumption for a network, we would have:
eopt ≤ E[Lv|N = n]
r
. (7.2)
Rather, we do not need to calculate the optimal probability p for being a cluster
head in a network to save energy. Our greatest concern is securing the data in
the network rather than efficiency. Because nodes are monitoring each other, if the
number of nodes in a cluster C is sufficiently large then other clusters can trust C.
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7.2 Some Assumptions
If we have N nodes in a field with area of A, the density of network would be:
D = N/A. (7.3)
If the transmission range for each node in a field is r, and the area that a node cover
with her transmission range is AT = pir
2. Number of Voronoi cells (clusters) if the
nodes perfectly place with one hop is:
p =
A
ATN
, (7.4)
in future we represent AT by AT,1 If we have k hops the ideal number of Voronoi cells
when nodes perfectly placed in a field would be:
AT,k ≤ pi(kr)2, (7.5)
the number of nodes N and area of the field A are free variables, range r, probability
p of being a cluster head and hop number would be dependent variables. Range and
hop number would affect the number of nodes in a cluster. We observe that the values
we would get from these formulas represent ideal values and in practice when nodes
are mobile and are not perfectly placed we could not get the same result as we get in
the perfect setup for sensors.
For simulating the network, we wanted to fix a security value V , the preferred
threshold, which is a minimal number of nodes in a cluster, as mentioned earlier the
security of clusters is important and if the number of nodes inside a cluster is enough
we would have a suitable amount of security in a cluster. Therefore, parameter V is
important. The probability of a node being a cluster head is p = 1V , if we have N
nodes in the whole network, therefore CLn =
N
V , would be the amount of clusters in
a network. We can calculate the range from the following:
AT,k =
A
CLn
. (7.6)
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In Tables 7.1 and 7.2, we simulated a network with different density values, as one
can see if the number of hops increases the number of clusters below security value
V (here less than 7) decreases. In Table 7.1 we wanted to have 7 or more nodes in
each cluster (the threshold V was 7). We could not get a suitable result for such a
small range. In Table 7.2 we made some changes on the range by using not restricted
threshold, for the V = 7 and p = 1
7
= 0.142 instead of having CLn = N/7 we used
CLn = N/14 therefore we could get larger range and the result of that was better. For
the case p = 0.11, we have CLn = N/9. For the case p = 0.12 we have CLn = N/8.
As one can see, if we decrease the amount of CLns in a network, we achieve better
results. Also, from these results we see that if the range and number of hops increase,
we decrease the number of clusters, as well as the number of forced cluster heads.
All of the results in these two tables are averages, which means we ran calculation
10 times and averaged the results. We did this because the program uses threads,
results are dissimilar, due to the latency of the threads running. These results are
not predictable, because the nodes randomly will be placed in the network and nodes
randomly by flip coins to determine if they will be cluster heads.
In Table 7.3 we show results of increasing the range for the nodes in a network.
As illustrated in the table, if the range increases, the average of number of nodes
in a cluster would increase, also the number of forced cluster heads decreased. But
if you look at Table 7.4, the percentage of the amount of clusters which have less
than threshold amount of members increases, which is not what we want for the
network. A possible explanation is that we use a mutex to lock other users from the
program, when one user find an opportunity, she will send invitation to all of her
neighbors. Therefore, if her range is more, more nodes will accept her invitation.
While other cluster heads did not have a chance to send invitation to their neighbors.
Therefore many of the cluster heads did not get a chance to send an invitation to
their neighborhood and these cluster heads would be by themselves. The reason the
average number of nodes in the Table 7.3 increases is because some of the clusters
have huge amount of nodes inside their cluster. Thus they increase the average. We
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ran an experiment to see how many clusters has nodes between 5 to 9, here 7 is the
security threshold, as you can see in Table 7.4 if the range increases, the amount of
clusters in the range of 5 ≤ n ≤ 9 decreases significantly. This means some of the
clusters have many members and others not enough members.
In conclusion, nodes need to have a suitable range for sending invitation and for
communication. If their range is too small then the number of clusters in a network
would increase and also there would be a lot of forced cluster heads. If the range is
too large, in addition to the cost of energy, we would have more cluster heads who do
not receive acceptances to their invitations, so there would be less clusters with the
desired amount of nodes in a cluster.
In order to calculate the cost of sending an invitation, we calculated the cost of a
broadcast by finding the cluster (tree) leaves Lc. Therefore, if we have nc nodes in a
group with Lc leaves, see Fig. 7.2, the broadcast cost in a group is:
costc = nc − Lc. (7.7)
In Fig. 7.2, there are 10 nodes, 5 of the nodes are tree leaves. Therefore, the cost of a
broadcast to send an invitation in this tree (cluster) is 5. So the cost of broadcast for
invitation for the whole cluster, where the number of clusters in a network is, CLn
would be:
Costbroadcast =
CLn∑
i=0
(nc − Lc). (7.8)
The average cost would be:
AvgCost =
Costbroadcast
CLn
. (7.9)
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Fig. 7.2.: Broadcast Tree
Table 7.1: Restricted Range
d N r hop prob p CLn n = 1 n ≤ Th nAvg Forced CH
6 350 0.48 3 0.142 105.3 61.4 83.7 3.35 53.9
6 350 0.48 2 0.142 110.8 66.4 91.4 3.23 59.4
6 350 0.48 1 0.142 175.7 131.6 164.3 2 124.3
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Table 7.2: Non-restricted Range Results
d N r hop prob p CLn n = 1 n ≤ Th nAvg Forced CH
5 350 0.56 3 0.142 61 21.7 37.4 5.79 9.6
5 350 0.56 2 0.142 65.1 24.3 42.4 5.4 13.7
5 350 0.56 1 0.142 106.3 65.7 85.6 3.31 54.9
6 350 0.67 3 0.142 59 17.4 35.6 5.97 7.6
6 350 0.67 2 0.142 65.2 23.8 42.4 5.41 13.8
6 350 0.67 1 0.142 101.6 60.1 80.7 3.49 50.2
7 350 0.79 3 0.142 63 22.6 39.5 5.58 11.6
7 350 0.79 2 0.142 64.7 23.9 40.7 5.51 13.3
7 350 0.79 1 0.142 106.3 64.3 86.6 3.33 54.9
8 350 0.9 3 0.142 60.9 21.2 37.3 5.82 9.5
8 350 0.9 2 0.142 68.5 28.4 45.8 5.23 17.1
8 350 0.9 1 0.142 102.1 61.5 80.7 3.4 50.7
8 300 0.97 3 0.142 52 18.1 32.3 5.7 9.9
8 300 0.97 2 0.142 62.2 30.1 43.5 4.9 20.1
8 300 0.97 1 0.142 99.7 66.3 82 3.1 57.6
6 350 0.67 2 0.11 67 32.4 49.9 5.4 26.8
6 350 0.67 2 0.12 62.3 25.1 42 5.7 17
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Table 7.3: Different Range
r CLn n = 1 n < Th nAvg Forced CH AT
1 0.97 87.4 46.8 66.1 4.03 36 2.95
2 1.07 72.3 33.9 51.5 4.9 20.9 3.59
3 1.17 67.8 32.2 47.8 5.21 16.4 4.3
4 1.27 62.1 29.7 43 5.69 10.7 5.06
5 1.37 57.4 27 39.1 6.18 6 5.86
6 11.47 56.3 29.7 40.3 6.27 4.9 6.78
7 1.57 58.8 33.4 43.5 6.04 7.4 7.74
8 1.67 52.4 29.2 38.2 6.74 1 8.76
9 1.77 53.1 32.1 39.6 6.65 1.7 9.84
10 1.87 52.1 32.3 40.1 6.77 0.7 10.98
11 1.97 52 32.7 38.9 6.78 0.6 12.19
12 2.07 51.8 35.3 40.4 6.86 0.4 13.46
13 2.17 51.4 35.2 40.4 6.86 0 14.7
14 2.27 51.5 35.5 40.4 6.85 0.1 16.1
Table 7.4: Less Than Threshold
row n ≥ Th percent 5 < n < 9
1 21.3 24.3 12.5
4 19.1 30.7 7.7
8 14.2 27 4.2
11 13.1 25.1 3.4
14 11.1 21.5 3.3
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8. FUTURE WORK AND CONCLUSION
In this work, we have constructed mechanism that secure a sensor network and achieve
it in an energy efficient manner. Essential to this construction is the ability to monitor
the network in small groups/clusters. In order to achieve this we have constructed
an efficient invitation protocols. The goal is to provide a sufficiently high percentage
of clusters whose membership exceed a suitable security threshold V . The invitation
protocol is an important contribution We assumed that all the nodes have the same
range and they do not change their range.
For future work one should consider the situation that nodes could utilize different
reception range and in the cases they did not receive any invitation, they may increase
their reception range after time T . Then we would have less clusters, also more
clusters would satisfy the the security threshold V . But this would come at a energy
cost and such a trade-off would need to be carefully analyzed.
There is a problem with new nodes, if new nodes are generated and join the
network, there is a problem that a cluster cannot determine if the nodes are actually
new nodes. The node which is malicious may masquerade a new node. The nodes
manufactured date does alleviate this problem to some degree.
There is another problem, there is a possibility that a malicious node may keep
joining and leaving clusters before she gets any bad reviews she leaves a group. One
needs to find mechanisms that identifies and prevents this behavior.
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